<Literature Log> V-2： A Combat History of the First Ballistic Missile

Author: T. D. Dungan

T. D. Dungan is a leading authority on the V-2 rocket and founding member of the International V-2 Rocket Research Group. He assisted with the restoration of the USAAF Museum’s V-2 and was a contributor to “Nordhausen: V-2 Rocket Factory,” an episode in the History Channel’s “Modern Marvels” series (Google Books)

• Write whatever comes to mind.

• Characteristics of the source:

  • Dornberger’s diary or some other quotes are often referenced.
    • It was Dornberger’s book.
  • The narrative style is quite engaging.
    • Scenes like meetings with Hitler, it’s like, how do they know?
  • V2 proponents believed in its effectiveness.
  • https://muse.jhu.edu/article/196440/pdf
    • Limitations are mentioned here.

Chapter 1

• However, skirting the Versailles Treaty was not the primary reason for rocket research, especially later on, after Hitler began violating its terms incessantly.
• I feel sorry for VfR.
  • They failed at crucial moments and were ultimately crushed by the government.
  • Only the most talented individuals were recruited.
• Peenemunde is cool.
  • The gradual development is impressive.
• I had the impression that Hitler was enthusiastic about allocating resources to the V2 just because rockets were cool.
  • But it seems that it was different (at least until 1940).
  • He didn’t seem very interested, actually.

Chapter 2

• Around 1941, Hitler became slightly interested in efficiently attacking London (while avoiding Todt’s interference).
• German is difficult.
  • “V1 (Versuchsmuster 1)” = “Prototype 1”
  • “V1 (Vergeltungswaffe 1)” = “Retribution Weapon 1”
• A4’s V (Versuchsmuster) 1 to V3 failed, and V4 succeeded just when the organization was about to be disbanded.
  • I’ve heard similar stories from SpaceX and IST.
  • A template?
• When entering the production phase, Dornberger wondered where he would get the labor force.
  • That’s where the prisoners come in.
  • It’s getting darker and darker.
  • They borrowed prisoners from the SS.

Chapter 3

• I realized that having air superiority is crucial for preventing information leaks.
• I couldn’t quite grasp Hitler’s decision-making criteria. He seemed to love grandiose things, but it seems that’s not the case.
• It seems that the British and Americans were going all out to attack the rockets.
  • The fear of the “unknown threat” and strategic confusion.
• It’s interesting to think that the Normandy landings could have been thwarted by rockets.
• Those below Dornberger were basically “young rocket enthusiasts.”
  • They loved pursuing technology, but it wasn’t their main duty to determine if it was really useful for the military.
  • Metz was in a free environment where he could feel discouraged by the situation.

Chapter 4

• It seems that Hitler’s intention was to have bomb shelters.
  • In the case of the Normandy landings, the only usable launch site was Wizernes by chance (p105).
  • However, Dornberger supported the mobile launchers.
• The US and UK had no choice but to attack the rocket production/launch sites.
  • Launch bunkers along the French coast, factories, Peenemunde (research facility), etc.
• Internal conflicts were tough.
  • Kammler vs Dornberger, for example.
    • Dornberger was desperate and almost quit.
  • Wehrmacht vs Waffen-SS.

Chapter 8

• It is generally considered a waste, but it may have had a significant impact on the war.

  • In previous chapters, there are stories about how they were fully committed to Crossbow, for example.
  • Hitler’s intention was simply to “bomb London,” there was no strategy.
    • The bombing of Berlin created a strong desire for revenge.
  • It is said that it would have been dangerous if ABC weapons had been loaded as warheads.
  • Eisenhower also said that it would have been dangerous if they had been completed a few years earlier.
  • The inaccuracy has always been mentioned, and that is indeed true.
    • One reason is that the maps were inherently inaccurate.
    • Also, the British intelligence agency worked hard to prevent information from flowing to the German side.- We had no choice but to rely on fake news or inaccurate information.

• The rocket development team couldn’t obtain much information from the UK, which hindered their ability to implement PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) and was not ideal.

• However, inaccuracy does not mean ineffectiveness.

• Considering the cost-effectiveness of human lives and impact, the air raids were quite effective.

• There were also various counterarguments to the ineffectiveness of the V2 rocket.

• Although it may not receive much attention, the shockwave effect was also significant.

• It is often said that if it had been completed a few years earlier, it would have been more effective, but it can also be said that being too ahead of its time was the problem.

• If it had come after the development of nuclear warheads and guidance systems, it would have been even more effective.

• This may be attributed to the genius of the people at Peenemunde.

• Similar things happened in the Iraq War, but the enemy had air superiority, so any attempt to replicate the V2 rocket was crushed from the start.

• Air superiority is crucial.

• Notable People:

  • Becker:
    • Von Braun learned from him.
    • He was in the army’s ballistic and munitions branch.
  • Dornberger:
    • Head of Peenemunde.
    • He had a military background.
  • Von Brauchitsch:
    • Became the head of the army after someone else was dismissed.
    • He knew Dornberger and seemed supportive of Peenemunde.
  • Fritz Todt:
    • A long-standing member of the Nazi party.
    • Became Minister of Armaments in 1940.
    • He was against Peenemunde and tried to hinder the flow of resources to rocket development.
    • Although he was negative towards rockets, he had significant achievements as Minister of Armaments.
    • It could be argued that not allocating funds to rockets was the right decision.
    • He was not skilled in political maneuvering.
  • Speer:
    • Todt’s successor as Minister of Armaments.
    • He understood the romance of rockets (whether that was a good thing is another question).
  • Degenkolb:
    • Brought in by Speer, he was an expert in efficient weapon production.
    • This was the military’s intention to transition from development to production.
    • He had a somewhat cold and calculating image.
    • Dornberger was concerned that research and development might be undervalued.